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NIKE V. KASKYWHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN...
Robert M. 0 'Neilt
Over the years, Nike's footwear promotions have been nothing if not provocative. During the 2000 Summer Olympics, Nike
briefly aired on NBC a television commercial featuring a wellknown female runner. She was shown being attacked while bathing in a remote cabin, and then being pursued through the woods
by a presumptive assailant who wielded a chainsaw. The athlete's
survival was apparently attributable to her superb condition-and,
not incidentally, to her clearly visible choice of Nike shoes for this
perilous journey. International outrage greeted the appearance of
this tasteless spoof of The Texas Chainsaw Massacre. Nike and
the network responded by withdrawing the ad from the airwaves,
though not after having created substantial ill will. Columnist
Ellen Goodman, for example, offered to "explain to [Nike] why a
slasher ad is as welcome as a fork in the eye of the Olympic family
audience," adding that "[t]his alleged satire of women's fear on a
program [celebrating] strengths didn't strike my funny bone."1
Whatever else may have been in doubt about the Olympic
slasher ads, there was not the slightest question that such messages
constituted commercial speech, and could have been regulated on
that basis. Nike's most recent controversy involves published material of a very different sort-statements that seek to explain its
overseas labor policies in response to extensive criticism of hiring
and other personnel practices at offshore manufacturing plants.
The California state courts had split sharply on the legal status of
those corporate statements, giving the United States Supreme
Court a seemingly ideal opportunity to clarify several key issues in
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia and Director, Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression.
Ellen Goodman, Sorry, Nike, I Just Don't Get That Ad, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2000,
at F7; see also Lisa D'Innocenzo, What Were They Thinking?, STRATEGY, August 26, 2002, at
7.
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the increasingly confusing doctrine of commercial speech. The
high Court's failure to pursue that opportunity, by dismissing the
case as improvidently granted after extensive briefing and oral argument, 3 deferred such urgently needed and long awaited clarification to a later day and another case.
As we await that later case, it may be useful to focus on several sources of special disappointment about the Nike outcome.
One cause of frustration was, of course, the failure to define
"commercial speech" with greater clarity, thereby determining
more precisely than have prior cases the line that separates commercial and non-commercial expression. Before addressing that
issue, however, there is an antecedent concern-the lack of clarity
about the basic values and purposes of the commercial speech doctrine, and specifically about the extent to which that doctrine was
misunderstood and misapplied by the California Supreme Court
majority. Two distinct dimensions merit attention-on one hand,
the indisputable fact that the recognition of advertising as deserving of partial protection was designed to expand, rather than to impair, the constitutional scope of expression; the other, that the central value of such protection is, as the Supreme Court has consistently stressed, to create a better informed community of consumers. In both respects, the California Supreme Court's resolution
seems to have turned back the clock in ways that many in the First
Amendment community fervently hoped the Justices would redress.
It may be useful to revisit briefly the origins of commercial
speech. Although ordinary advertising was consistently denied
First Amendment protection until the mid 1970s, 4 the Supreme
Court's earliest recognition of commercial speech 5 revealed an
unmistakable design to enlarge the scope of favored expression by
adding at least partial protection for a category of material that had
hitherto simply been excluded from the constitutional calculus. At
no time since the courts first conferred partial protection on commercial speech has there been even a hint that protection would be
lessened for messages (even if related in some way to a commer3 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
4 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (stating that there is no constitutional
limitation on government regulation of commercial advertising), overruledby Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
5 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(recognizing advertisements of prescription drug prices as protected commercial speech); see
also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-25 (1975) (finding that a newspaper advertisement
placement for services for women in need of an abortion was entitled to First Amendment protection).
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cial transaction) which were fully protected under the First
Amendment before that time. It would be ironic in the extreme if
a consequence of raising the level of protection for advertising
were to lower or diminish protection for non-advertising corporate
messages. Yet that seems to be precisely the effect of the California Supreme Court's resolution of the Nike case.
There can be little doubt that some (if not all) of the corporate
communications at issue in this case would, before 1976, have
been fully protected.6 At such an earlier time, when courts had no
middle ground and were forced to choose between total protection
and none at all, it seems clear from the content and context of
Nike's labor-policy statements and other communications that
most courts would have classified such material as deserving of
complete protection. Thus, in the way the California Supreme
Court drew the line between commercial and non-commercial
speech for the purpose of this case, the net effect seems to have
been to reduce protection for arguably pure speech, rather than to
enhance protection for commercial expression. Such a result
seems markedly at variance with the benign goals of what set out
to be, and for most of the past three decades has been, an inherently ameliorative concept.
The other notable irony is closely related. From the outset,
the U.S. Supreme Court has stressed that the basic rationale for
protecting commercial speech is not to enrich producers of products, or the news media that advertise those products, but to inform
consumers and to enable those consumers to make better choices
among available products and services. Time and again, the Court
has viewed with disfavor "commercial speech bans [that] not only
hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues
of public policy."' 7 The Court has consistently disapproved of
"regulations [of advertising] that seek to keep people in the dark
8
for what the government perceives to be their own good.",
However, such a result seems the inescapable consequence of the
California Supreme Court's decision. That decision was sharply
criticized both by the California Supreme Court's own dissenters, 9
and by Justices Breyer and O'Connor, who not only faulted the
dismissal of the case on procedural grounds, but expressed their
6 For a thoughtful and contrary view, however, see elsewhere in this symposium, Erwin
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v.

Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1158-60 (2004).
7 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
8 Id.

9 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263 (Cal. 2002) (Chin, J., dissenting); id. at 268
(Brown, J., dissenting).
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disapproval of the substantive result left intact by their colleagues'
refusal to review the merits. 10
Troubling though both these concerns remain, many months
after the disposition of the Nike case, by far the greatest of the lost
opportunities lay in the conceptual realm. It has been clear since
the mid 1970s that we lack a reliable definition of "commercial
speech." One cannot even say, with Justice Stewart's intuitive
confidence about obscenity, "I know it when I see it." All we understand with reasonable certainty is the outcome of relatively easy
cases at the margins. At one extreme, we know that not all paid
advertising copy is properly classified as "commercial speech"; as
Justice Brennan explained in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
sponsored civil rights appeal was "not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen,
[since, inter alia] [i]t communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances [and] protested claimed abuses . . . .," At
the other end of the spectrum, we know that a published message
1
which "does no more than propose a commercial transaction" 2seeking solely the purchase of a product or service-is core or
classic commercial speech, partially if less than fully protected
since the mid 1970s, but never likely to be confused with fully
protected expression. That is about as far as existing precedent
will take us with confidence; virtually all the cases that have
reached the Supreme Court have involved concededly commercial
speech, creating no need to address the definitional issue, as the
Nike case clearly would have done had the Justices addressed the
merits.
The slate was not totally blank, however. As early as 1980,
the Supreme Court recognized an important distinction among
communications that public utilities had sent their customers. By
placing product-linked promotional messages on the commercialspeech side of the line, the majority in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York 13 rejected
Justice Stevens's rather lonely plea that full protection should extend to "any advertising that links a product to a current public
debate." 14 But the majority also recognized the risks of permitting
states to regulate, as commercial speech, an inappropriately broad
'0Nike, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2559 (2003) (Breyer and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
IIN.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
12 Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
13447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that advertising, which promoted greater use of electricity, qualified as commercial speech).
14Id. at 563 n.5.
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range of corporate communications. And in a companion case decided the very same day, the Court ruled that "utilities enjoy the
full panoply of First Amendment protections for their direct comments on public issues."' 15 In the process, Justice Powell perceptively cautioned against a more lenient standard which might "blur
further the line the Court has sought to draw in commercial speech
cases"-a clear and early recognition that the waters had already
become murkier than they were when commercial speech made its
promising debut.
Three years later, the Court came even closer to tackling the
definitional issue. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the
Justices recognized that certain of the corporate communications,
the regulation of which they had agreed to review, did not reside7
unambiguously on either side of this increasingly elusive line.1
Most of a condom manufacturer's unsolicited mailings pertained
unmistakably and directly to products for which it sought potential
customers, and thus seemed to the Court to fall "within the core
notion of commercial speech."' 18 But the mailings also included
two informational pamphlets about contraception, which contained
no more than passing references to the manufacturer's own brand
of condom. 19
The Justices eventually ruled that these messages also constituted commercial speech, though recognizing the difficulty of the
classification process. Such a conclusion was clearly not compelled by exclusive reliance on any one of what the Court identified as the three key factors-the company's concession that the
pamphlets were advertisements, occasional references to one of its
specific products, and an economic motivation for the mailings.
Yet, concluded the Court, "[t]he combination of all these characteristics ... provides strong support for the.. . conclusion that the
informational pamphlets are properly characterized as commercial
speech."2°
Justice Marshall, writing for the Bolger majority, added a crucial qualification: "[A]dvertising which 'links a product to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech.",21 This opinion also caul5Id. at 563 n.5 (referring to the holding in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), decided the same day).
17463 U.S. 60, 65-68 (1983).
" Id. at 66.
'9 Id. at 66 nn.12-13.

20Id. at 66-67.
21Id. at 68 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563 n.5).
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tioned in a prescient footnote, "[W]e express no opinion as to
whether reference to any particular product or service is a necessary element of commercial speech, 22 thus deferring the elusive if
vital process of classifying promotional materials that were unmistakably product-specific. Justice Stevens, who concurred but felt
that more needed to be said on the matter of definition and classification, 23 has urged-far more than any of his colleagues-a
sharper focus on that dimension of commercial speech, although
ironically it was the same Justice Stevens who most recently offered, in Nike, the principal explanation for the very dismissal of
the case which would finally have forced that issue.
Meanwhile, the lower courts have done their best to chart a
course through this tangled thicket. Of special interest and relevance is the protracted litigation involving federal regulation of the
mailing by drug companies to physicians of textbook excerpts and
medical journal reprints designed to promote off-label uses of
FDA-approved drugs.24 Though much of this case's protracted and
devious journey through the federal courts reflects jurisdictional
and procedural disputes, the district judge came about as fully as
any court to date to tackling the daunting task of clarifying ambiguous or multi-purpose promotional materials. In the summer of
1998, Judge Royce Lamberth squarely addressed the issue of how
such materials should be classified for regulatory and First
Amendment purposes. In Washington Legal Foundationv. Friedman, the court initially rejected the FDA's puzzling claim that
such mailings enjoyed no constitutional protection whatsoever because, as "promotions," they involved "conduct" rather than
"speech. 25 Conversely, the drug companies argued (with support
from several amici 26 ) that the mailings were fully protected
speech-a status which no one would deny when those same articles had been published in peer-reviewed medical journals and
textbooks, or when distributed by their authors to academic
colleagues. Judge Lamberth recognized the materials in issue as
(using Justice Stevens' language from Bolger) a "complex mixture[] of commercial and non-commercial elements. 27 He ac22 Id. at 67 n. 14.
23 See id. at 80-84 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the offensiveness of the mailing
in question did not justify government interference).
24 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998), vacated in part by Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney,
202 F.3d 331 (D.D. Cir. 2000).

2 id. at 59-60.
26 The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, which the author

directs, was one of the organizations filing as amici in support of this position throughout the
WLF litigation.
27 WLF, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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knowledged that such materials would be fully protected during
academic or scientific publication and distribution. Moreover, the
court recognized that merely adding an economic motive to the
28
actual mailing scenario did not by itself forfeit such protection.
Judge Lamberth also observed that sending these reprints and excerpts to physicians for the purpose of encouraging their off-label
prescription of FDA-approved drugs was certainly not a familiar
form of product promotion.2 9
Yet, in the end, the district court invoked Bolger's three desiderata to conclude that such mailings were properly classified as
commercial speech. Among the crucial factors was the status of
these materials as "advertisements as that term is commonly understood," in that each referred to a specific product of the manufacturer who mailed them. Moreover, the drug companies "clearly
have an economic motivation for providing the information" since
"the promotional efforts at issue have a positive effect on a physician's prescription practices and therefore on sales." 30 Possibly
pertinent to that ruling, if less explicit, were the court's declared
(though not fully developed) concerns both for the substantial
health interests on which the FDA's regulations relied, and its recognition of the "considerable financial resources available to
pharmaceutical companies." Judge Lamberth also remarked that
"manufacturers will likely seek only to disseminate information
that presents their product in a favorable light"-an observation
which ought not, strictly speaking, push otherwise ambiguous materials over the commercial-speech line, but did nonetheless offer
valuable insight into the court's view of the drug makers' promotional efforts.
At least one other court had applied Bolger in similar fashion
to material that fell into the gray zone between commercial and
non-commercial expression. In Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren,31 the Ninth Circuit applied a California statute that
forbade manufacturers and distributors to represent certain environmental attributes of their products without having met specific
statutory definitions for such terms as "ozone friendly" and "biodegradable."
The advertisers argued unsuccessfully that such
claims for their products were fully protected expression; the appeals court found, however, that all three of the Bolger criteria had

2' id. at 62.
29 Id. at 63-64.
30 Id. at 64-65.

" 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994).
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been satisfied and that these statements were properly classified as
commercial speech.32
Thus, by the time the Nike dispute reached the California
court of appeals in early 2000, such limited consensus as had
emerged did seem to favor treating borderline promotional materials as commercial speech, whatever might be their extenuating
qualities. Yet, as that court immediately recognized, the few potentially helpful precedents-like Bolger itself-involved material
that was product-specific and had been distributed as part of a focused marketing program. Moreover, it was by now abundantly
clear that Bolger-albeit the best potential source in Supreme
Court jurisprudence-offered no workable definition. Nor could
clearer guidance be found elsewhere on an issue that, however infrequent, could and did assume major importance in the application of the commercial speech doctrine.
Where else, one might well ask, had a category of expression
been welcomed into the family of constitutionally protected interests without ever having been properly defined or identified?
Though one must sympathize with the frustrations that led Justice
Stewart to remark of the classification of sexually explicit material, "I know it when I see it," his colleagues had offered as early
as the Roth v. United States33 case no fewer than eight separate and
distinct definitions for obscenity. The fault in that troubled and
confusing field has not been one of too few, but rather of too many
definitions. In the realm of commercial speech, by contrast, the
failing has been one of too few (if any) definitions.
I. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH: WHYS AND WHEREFORES
Although it may seem obvious, a few words might be in order
to give substance and urgency to the quest for an adequate definition of commercial speech. As with any line that must be drawn
between expression that is fully protected, and material that claims
only partial protection, precision in the location of that line, and
consistency among those who must draw it, are vital to the preservation of First Amendment interests.34 The hazards of imprecise
definitions or vague standards are legion, and need hardly be recounted here. At a more practical level, the Nike case graphically
illustrates the need for, and the potential value of, a far more reli32

Id. at 728.

" 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3 Cf Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (finding unconstitutional a statute
crinminalizing the sale of obscene books that did not contain a scienter requirement on the theory
that the statute was overbroad and would inhibit protected expression as well).
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able definition than currently exists. If the California Supreme
Court majority could, after reviewing the relevant precedents,
plausibly classify Nike's corporate communications as commercial
speech simply because they were "directed by a commercial
speaker to a commercial audience and ... made representations of
fact about the speaker's own business operations for the purpose of
promoting sales of its products," then we are indeed in trouble.
The case for a better definition should need no further elaboration.
The critical question is what should be the contents of that definition.
The quest for a better definition should begin with the three
factors that the Bolger Court invoked, and which have been relied
upon by lower courts in subsequent cases. For starters, as Bolger
itself suggested, an economic motive may be a necessary ingredient of such a definition, but is hardly sufficient, much less dispositive. Even paid advertisements, such as the civil rights appeal in
the New York Times 35 libel case, should on this basis (at the very
least) be removed from the commercial speech category. Interestingly, this element cuts both ways: The need to begin the analysis
by finding an economic motive strongly implies that where such a
motive is absent, even when the communications more closely resemble advertising than did the Times civil rights appeal, a finding
of commercial speech may not logically follow. This obverse
situation is not hypothetical. Consider, for example, a challenge
currently pending in the Ninth Circuit to California's special tobacco distribution tax, and especially to the use of a portion of the
proceeds to fund state-created anti-smoking ads and commercials. 36 The tax-affected distributors have contested the funding
mechanism as coerced expression, claiming specifically that antismoking messages disseminated by government must be deemed
pure, not commercial, speech because the state clearly has no
"economic motive" for posting such health-related communications. The tobacco distributors' challenge may ultimately fail on
other grounds, but among the obstacles should not be any doubt
that the subsidized government messages to which they object
could properly be classified as commercial speech in the absence
of any economic motive on the speaker's part.
The second of the Bolger criteria fares much less well under
close scrutiny. To ask whether the messages at issue are or are not
"advertisements" as that term is commonly understood seems, at
35 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094-110 (E.D. Cal. 2003),
appeal docketed, Civ. No. 03-16535 (9th Cir.).
36
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best, tautological. This question is the very one to be decidednot an analytic component in the decisional process. Moreover,
there unmistakably are some "advertisements" that cannot be
deemed commercial speech-notably the sponsored civil rights
appeal published in the New York Times, clearly labeled as "advertising" and for other purposes treated as an "advertisement." Conversely, there may be sponsored messages that one would not normally regard as "advertising" (e.g., the medical reprints and excerpts in the Washington Legal Foundation case) to which, nonetheless, the commercial speech standard could apply to certain
promotional uses or novel forms of dissemination. Thus, to ask
whether a message looks or acts like an advertisement does no
more than pose or restate the crucial question, and surely does not
help us answer it.
Bolger's third desideratum-whether the material refers to a
specific product-is only slightly more helpful than the second.
As the Bolger Court itself recognized, this factor is inevitably
somewhat ambiguous-reason enough why Justice Marshall, in a
footnote, expressly reserved the question "whether reference to
any particular product or service is a necessary element of commercial speech. 37 If the material contains no such reference to a
product or service, one might indulge a presumption against classifying it as commercial speech, recognizing as one of the complicating factors that a speaker's motivations for mentioning a product or service could vary for reasons unrelated to the rationale of
why messages should be classified as commercial or noncommercial speech.
The Bolger factors thus offer at most a starting point in the
definitional process, but leave close and difficult cases without
adequate guidance. The quest for a more useful standard involves
three additional elements-the speaker, the context, and the audience. We might begin with a brief assessment of the source of the
communications. To the California Supreme Court in Nike, there
seemed something vaguely sinister about the fact that "a commercial speaker" was making "representations about [its] own business
operations." Apart from the obvious fact that most commercial
speech comes from a commercial or business source, disparagement of corporate speakers seems inappropriate to the constitutional analysis.
Although remarkably little has been written on this potentially
important topic, Professor Martin Redish and a former student offered invaluable guidance in a law review article from the late
37 463 U.S. at 67 n.14.
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1990s, which exhaustively analyzes the role and nature of business
speech, and effectively refutes myriad potential reasons for disparaging corporate communications.3 8 While much more could be
said on this issue, it should suffice for present purposes to establish the neutrality, at least, of the speaker's identity, and to recognize that a corporate source should not be inherently suspect in
such cases.39
The matter of context deserves a more detailed analysis. As
Justice Stevens has urged on several occasions, commercial speech
analysis should focus far more on context than our current preoccupation with content seems to permit. 40 Whether or not a message reflects an economic motive, or refers to a specific product or
service, the setting in which that message is disseminated merits
more substantial attention than the courts at any level have accorded it. Among the reasons for denying full First Amendment
protection to messages that "merely propose a commercial transaction" are at least two factors that implicitly reflect a judicial concern about the context in which the typical sales pitch takes place.
On one hand, the risks of distorting a consumer's judgment
through deception or misinformation are far greater when the message is part of a "hard sell," whether or not it occurs face-to-face
or caller-to-caller. The Supreme Court's recurrent and quite appropriate insistence that only non-deceptive commercial speech
merits constitutional protection clearly evidences such a concern. 41
Moreover, the Court's readiness to permit government regulation
of "in your face" solicitations such as those of ambulance-chasing
attorneys offers further evidence of a special concern that consumers need protection at the moment when they may be most susceptible to just such appeals. 42 Finally, the importance of context
largely explains the Justices' greater willingness to sustain even
fairly onerous disclosure requirements imposed on advertisers,
where such burdens would almost certainly fail if applied to comparable non-commercial speakers. 43
38 See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
CorporateSpeech and the Theory of Free Expression,66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (1998).
39 For variant views elsewhere in this Symposium, see the thoughtful comments of C.
Edward Baker, Paternalism,Politics,and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary
in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1179-81 (2004).
40 E.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80-84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41 See Freidman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979) (explaining why the regulation of deceptive commercial speech in cases involving the usage of trade names is permissible).
42See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995) (upholding a prohibition on direct-mail solicitations by lawyers to accident victims during the first thirty days following an accident).
43 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985) (dis-
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Conversely, statements that are made to the public at large, or
in the abstract, by a manufacturer or distributor, even when they
reflect a clear and indisputably economic motive, pose such risks
to a far lesser degree. Moreover, the opportunities for inquiry,
refutation, and counter speech so central to the full protection of
non-commercial speech are clearly much greater when statements
are made apart from an immediate sales pitch or product- and consumer-specific appeal. To the extent that the process of classifying messages as commercial or non-commercial should reflect
broader First Amendment values, such as the potential for "robust
debate," the obvious and substantial differences between an immediate sales pitch on one hand, and general corporate communications on the other hand, surely deserve a place in the definitional
process."a While consideration of content of course remains an
essential part of the definitional process, the heretofore largely neglected dimension of context seems at least as clearly deserving of
consideration.
The third potentially valuable, but largely neglected, factor is
the audience-specifically, the consumers to whom a message is
directed. In a very real sense, that is what commercial speech is
all about. Without consumers, it is far from clear that commercial
speech would have any meaning-and surely the rationale for its
protection would be vastly different and greatly diminished from
the one that courts have recognized. To appreciate the importance
of the audience in the equation, we need to revisit the roots of
commercial speech. We do know that advertising was unprotected-a sort of First Amendment pariah-until the mid 1970s,
although (unlike other unprotected categories such as obscenity
and child pornography) without the benefit of any exposition of
why such messages were undeserving. While the Supreme Court
never explained its denial of even minimal protection to commercial speech before the mid 1970s, we may assume that so disparaging a view must have reflected at least in part the perceived absence of ideas or substance.45
cussing disclosure requirements and commercial speech in general, and specifically upholding a
requirement that a lawyer disclose possible fee liability in an advertisement).
4 For further elaboration elsewhere in this Symposium of a compatible view, see Deborah
J. La Fetra, Kick It Up a Notch: FirstAmendment Protectionfor Commercial Speech, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1205, 1226-28 (2004).
45 Despite the omission of any mention of advertising in Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court
would many years later imply a connection between the two cases: "Our question is whether
speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' is so removed from any
Iexposition of ideas' ... that it lacks all protection." Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
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Indeed, the Chrestensen46 ruling followed by only a matter of
weeks the Court's decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire sustaining a conviction for "fighting words," and in the process excluding from the First Amendment "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem., 47 The ensuing litany specifically mentioned "the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words"-the last item on the list being the focus of the immediate
judgment. 48 The absence of advertising from this seemingly comprehensive list of disfavored types of expression seems puzzling in
view of the close proximity of the two decisions. The anomaly
was compounded by the complete absence in the Chrestensen
opinion of even so rudimentary an explanation for refusing protection as the Justices had offered a few weeks later, in the specific
context of fighting words, for relegating a category of speech to
the realm of least-favored expression.
A third of a century later, when the Court was finally ready to
confer partial protection on commercial speech, one might reasonably have expected some explanation for the absence of past
protection, as well as a statement of rationale for the more favorable view now being announced. The latter was indeed forthcoming; the former, however, remained as obscure as it had ever been.
Curiously, Justice Blackmun not only offered no such explanation,
but actually recast what little history there was. The Bigelow
Court now insisted that Chrestensen had been "distinctly a limited" holding, concerned mainly with time, place and manner and
the degree of deference due to municipal regulation of use of the
streets-a judgment which could not fairly "support any sweeping
proposition that advertising is unprotected per se."4 9 The few intervening cases hardly support so benign a view-else, for example, there would have been no need for Justice Brennan to explain
at such length in the New York Times libel case why the published
civil rights appeal at issue there could not possibly be deemed
"purely commercial advertising" to which the First Amendment
was categorically inapplicable. °
Given the complete absence of any explanation for having
historically denied First Amendment protection to advertising, the
rationale for partial acceptance now assumes even greater impor46 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (April 3, 1942).
47 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (March 9, 1942).
41 Id. at 571-72.
49 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975).

50N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tance. Providentially, the plaintiffs in the Virginia State Board
case-the first occasion to declare the current standard-were consumers, not producers or distributors. 51 That circumstance made
even easier a course to which the Court was clearly committedrecognizing as the primarily protected interests those of consumers
to receive information of potential value in making informed decisions, rather than (as with other expressive freedoms) the interests
of the speaker, writer or publisher. That all the major challenges
after Virginia Pharmacy were brought by producers or distributors,
or by media who publish or broadcast advertising, has in no sense
undermined or diluted the importance of that initial focus upon the
presence of a well-informed consumer population as the principal
beneficiaries of partial protection for commercial speech.
Indeed, the important exceptions which the Court initially imposed on that protection-that the product or service must be lawful, and that the advertising not be deceptive or misleadingclearly reflect such a solicitude for the consumer. In later cases,
the Court's sympathy for disclosure requirements elaborated that
primarily consumer focus; a readiness, for example, to compel an
advertiser to reveal information in ways that might elsewhere be
vulnerable to First Amendment challenge as "coerced expression"
reflects the high Court's acceptance of policies that maximize the
flow to consumers of potentially helpful information pursuant to
"disclosure requirements [that] are reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers. 52 Virtually every
application and refinement of the commercial speech doctrine
during the past thirty years has been driven by such a primary solicitude for an optimally informed consumerate. What has been
curiously lacking is any comparable judicial recognition of that
central value in framing the test that distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial speech.
To the extent that the audience matters in this equation, the
judgment whether or not a specific message is commercial speech
should assess the message's impact upon that audience, or its potential value to them. If the consumer's only conceivable benefit
from his or her receipt of a corporate message is an enhanced capacity to decide whether to engage a service or buy a productinformation about price, availability, durability and other specific
qualities, warranties and other protections, etc.-then the message
would seem properly classified as commercial speech. If, however, the potential value of the message extends beyond the imme51Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
52 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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diate judgment whether or not to buy the product or servicegeneral information about the company's environmental policies,
for example-the fact that a consumer may be favorably (or unfavorably) disposed to buy on the basis of such information should
not, by itself, cause the message to be classified as commercial
speech.
A more complete definition of commercial speech would,
therefore, start with the Bolger factors-or at least the two of them
that are potentially helpful (omitting the tautological "does it look
like advertising?"). An economic motive, and specific reference to
a particular product or service, may indeed usefully begin the
process, but (as the confusion in Nike itself illustrates) hardly serve
to differentiate logically or consistently between corporate messages that are properly classified as commercial speech and those
that are not. If we add to the mix, as proposed here, consideration
of speaker, context and audience, we have a far better chance of
emerging with workable standards that will help resolve difficult
cases falling somewhere between the familiar messages at both
ends of the spectrum.
Application of such a more refined standard to cases like Nike
should be relatively easy. The presence of an economic motive at
first makes the disputed messages look like commercial speech,
while the absence of specific product or service references pushes
strongly in the other direction. More important, the presence of a
corporate speaker is hardly disabling. The context is clearly one in
which general information is being imparted, far from any immediate or specific sales pitch to which a commercial speech classification appropriately follows. Finally, and perhaps most important,
the audience-consumers of many products including footwearreceive a broad array of information about corporate labor policies.
Whether that information makes them more or less likely to buy
Nike shoes, or to recommend to others the purchase of Nike products, should never be dispositive in such a case. A conscientious
application of these desiderata would confirm the judgment
reached by California's two lower courts and its Supreme Court
dissenters, and urged by Justices Breyer and O'Connor. Such a
process also shows how very far the California Supreme Court majority strayed from the central values on which the commercial
speech doctrine rests.
A final and novel prospect deserves brief consideration: Might
there be some merit in recognizing a third category of expression-one that is neither classically commercial speech, nor fully
protected speech? Consider the possibility of treating messages
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such as the overseas labor bulletins in the Nike case (or the utility
promotions in Central Hudson, the off-label drug reprints in WLF,
and the contraceptive pamphlets in Bolger) as less than fully protected speech on one hand, yet on the other hand as more protected
than pure advertising. One of the limitations of the current analysis is the absence of any middle ground or intermediate option between the two poles-a disjunction which artificially compels
courts to choose one extreme or the other, with drastic consequences, when in fact the real-world spectrum of corporate communications is far more varied and complex. At least one possibly
useful analogy comes to mind: In the realm of libel, the New York
Times case seemed at first to create a sharp distinction (for purposes of the fair-comment privilege) between defamatory statements about public officials and public figures on one hand, and
on the other hand statements about private individuals-suggesting
that the former would be fully privileged, while the latter would
remain unconditionally actionable. What emerged in the ensuing
decisions was a sort of hybrid, in which libelous statements about
private individuals are partially privileged if they involve a "matter
of public concern, ' 3 but are essentially unprivileged (and actionable upon proof only of fault or negligence) if no matter of public
concern is present.54 By analogy, it might be useful to differentiate
between those corporate communications that "simply propose a
commercial transaction" and those that involve a "matter of public
concern"-even if messages of the latter type might enhance consumer demand for a product or service, and might even contain
references to the speaker's market brands.
The consequences of recognizing such a middle ground-a
category of what might be termed "public interest corporate
speech"-need to be much further refined. Perhaps, for example,
such messages would enjoy a stronger presumption of nondeceptiveness than would attach to purely commercial advertising.
Noting that the Supreme Court has allowed states to forbid advertising of professional services under a trade name, on the presumption that such generic titles are inherently deceptive or misleading

53 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 362 (1974) (distinguishing between
statements about public and private individuals).
54 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985)
(holding that recovery of punitive damages in a defamation case, absent actual malice, is permissible when the defamation in question does not involve a matter of public concern).
53 Although reaching a rather different conclusion, Professor James Weinstein suggests a
comparable analogy in his contribution to this Symposium. See James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1098-99, 1117, 1130-33 (2004).
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to consumers, 56 perhaps any such blanket presumption would not
be indulged in the course of reviewing the regulation of publicconcern communications. It might also be appropriate for courts
to require demonstration of a more substantial governmental interest in support of constraints upon public concern messages than
the current test requires in regulating ordinary advertising. Such a
standard would respond to the deep concern that Justices Blackmun and Brennan raised in their Central Hudson concurrence,
where they warned that, had there been a better "fit" between
means and end, the majority ruling would have allowed New
York's Public Service Commission to forbid promotional mailings
by regulated utilities that were designed to increase air conditioning consumption. 57 If, instead, something approaching a "compelling interest" were required before government could constitutionally constrain corporations in their dissemination of public concern
communications, the options open to courts in the ambiguous or
middle ground so well illustrated by the Nike case would be
greatly enhanced. Consequently, the risks of having to choose between two extremes, neither of which really suits the facts, would
be substantially mitigated. Some such creative corollary seems
long overdue, if not indeed essential, to preserve the commercial
speech doctrine from another judicial disaster of Nike proportions.

See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) (noting the significant possibility of
trade names being used in a misleading manner).
57 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579 (1980).

